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Psychology

Uncertain Responses by Five-Year-Olds in a Memory Monitoring Task
Director: Wendy E. Shields,

This study investigated memory monitoring in preschool children via the
use of inferential observation of task performance. Forty five-year
olds performed in 'a pictorial serial-probe recognition task that
featured an uncertain response. Their behavioral responses without the
use of self-report were examined because the literature suggests that
the use of verbal reports to assess metacognition in young children has
many potential limitations. Participants were given an option to escape
trials of their choosing, perhaps those that yielded the most
indeterminate memory traces. It was hypothesized that five-year-olds
would accurately monitor their short-term memory and the pattern of
their escape responses would mirror the serial position curve of their
primary memory performance, as. has been documented in adult humans and
rhesus monkeys. However, the pattern of responding in our five-yearolds differed from that of the adult humans and non-human primates.
Children's primary memory performance was reflected in a pronounced
serial position curve, that corresponds to the curves found in adult
human and monkey studies but the pattern of their escape responses was
very different. It appears that the five-year-olds use disparate
strategies when facing uncertainty. These strategies, as well as
implications for future research in this area are discussed.
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Uncertain Responses by Five-Year-Olds in a
Memory Monitoring Task
Cognitive psychological literature was first introduced to the
term "meta" in relation to memory in 1971/ when John Flavell coined the
term "metamemory" as one's knowledge of one's own memory (Flavell,
1971). The study of metamemory or metacognition (cognition about
cognition) has been for decades an exciting albeit problematic area of
research. In many of his works, Flavell (e.g., 1979, 1981, and 1987)
attempted to construct an appropriate taxonomy of the concept of
metacognition. In particular, he made a distinction between two aspects
of metacognition: metacognitive knowledge and metacognitive experiences.
Metacognitive knowledge refers to the portion of knowledge one has
available in long-term memory regarding facts about cognition in general
and about one's own cognition in particular. People can often verbalize
this information. Hence metacognitive knowledge is considereddeclarative. For example, John Smith knows that it is impossible for a
person to perfectly recall an 18-digit number in a serial recall task.
In fact, he knows that, in his own case, recalling an-8-digit number
would be an unprecedented feat.
Metacognitive knowledge includes three different clusters of
variables: person, task, and strategy. Person variables refer to the
knowledge and beliefs humans have about themselves as cognitive beings
(e.g., John Smith knows the capacity of his own short-term memory). Task
variables correspond to the knowledge of goals or objectives of a
cognitive activity (e.g., John knows that the task requires the recall
of an 18-digit number).. Finally, strategy■variables refer to cognitions
or other behaviors utilized to achieve these goals (e.g., John knows
that he should use the "Palm Pilot" his mother gave him for his
birthday!.
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Metacognitive experiences are any conscious cognitive or emotional
experiences that an individual encounters before, during, or after a
cognitive activity. There are two aspects of metacognitive experiences:
monitoring and control (or regulation). Cognitive monitoring is the
ability to assess one's own cognitive processes. It includes memory,
comprehension and reality monitoring. Memory monitoring (e.g., Hart,
1965) includes assessments of one's memory with regard to the presence
or absence of certain information. Comprehension monitoring (e.g.,
Markman, 1977) involves the realization that one does or does not
understand incoming information. Reality monitoring (e.g., Johnson &,
Raye, 1981) refers to the ability to distinguish between'dreaming,
imagining and reality.
Cognitive control or regulation is the action taken to affect the
course of cognitive processing. This action is the result of information
obtained from the monitoring process. For example, if the monitoring of
comprehension during reading indicates a lack of understanding, one
might decide to switch from "automatic reading pilot" to a more
effortful, attentive style of reading.
Perils with the Definition
From its inception, metacognition has been a difficult and rather
complex area of study. On several occasions metacognition has been
referred to as a fuzzy and inadequately understood concept (Brown, 1987;
Wellman, 1983). I will now discuss some of the issues that have troubled
the scientific community with regard to this topic.
First, the fact that metacognition has been defined as both
knowledge about cognition, and the monitoring/regulation of cognition
creates a problem for the interpretation of research findings. These two
components of metacognition are interconnected. However, theix nature
and course of development might-be quite different. Knowledge about .
cognition, declarative knowledge, is presumed to be definable and
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stable, and is usually documented rather late in development (Brown,
1987). The monitoring and regulation of cognition, on the other hand,
may make use of procedural knowledge, which often is not statable. Brown
suggested that monitoring and regulation of cognition might be dependent.
primarily on the task and circumstances and therefore could be
relatively age-independent. Some researchers have argued that labeling
both a person’s knowledge about cognition and his or her use of that
knowledge with one term is ill-advised. Hence the two-component
definition should be reduced, leaving out the monitoring and regulatory
processes (Cavanaugh & Perlmutter, 1982) . To date, there is no general
agreement on this definitional issue (Baker, 1994).
The second controversy

in the

appropriate distinction of what
be labeled as "cognitive"

can

literature deals with the
be considered "meta" and what should

(Brown, 1987). The literature is confusing

(Baker, 1994). Flavell (e.g., 1979) distinguished between these two,
stating that cognitive progression is achieved via the use of cognitive
strategies, whereas the monitoring of this progress employs
metacognitive strategies. For example, the use of mnemonics to memorize
the names of students in my class would be a cognitive strategy, and the
use of mnemonics to monitor or examine my memorization enterprise (as in
a self-test of memory) would
The third disagreement

be a metacognitive strategy.
is the

argument whether metacognition can

be both conscious and unconscious (Baker, 1994). This brings us back to
the original Flavellian taxonomy of metacognition, namely that this
concept consists of metacognitive knowledge and metacognitive
experiences. Metacognitive experiences Can refer to the cognitions or
feelings that are easily accessed by an individual, such as the
anticipation of a problem before reading a chapter on quantum physics.
However, this experience can also refer to feelings that may be on the
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brink of consciousness, such as a fleeting feeling of delight after
accomplishing a cognitive task (Gombert, 1993).
.Moreover, Brown (1987) noted that metacognitive knowledge is
Conscious and therefore should be declarative or definable, but an
individual is assumed to have this knowledge only if he or she can state
or define it. Therefore, this criterion is circular. In addition, Brown
distinguishes between self-regulation during learning, which is often an
unconscious experience,.and conscious manipulation of one's thoughts,
which is. thinking about thinking or conscious regulation. She states
that this distinction has been confused in the metacognition literature.
The former refers to the active procedure of trial-and-error (systematic
error detection and correction) evident even in very young children's
learning. However, unless these behaviors reflect deliberate strategic
action, they should not be termed "metacognitive1'. The latter
corresponds- to Piagetian reflected abstraction that emerges at the stage
of formal operations, and allows one to solve problems or test
hypotheses in thought or on a mental plane, which is obviously a very
conscious experience. Therefore, Brown concluded: "Whatever distinctions'
must be made in order to render metacognition a more malleable concept,
this one is a fine candidate for inclusion in the list"

(p. 96).

Previous Research on Metacoqnition in Children
The first attempts to assess metacognition in children were in the
area of memory (metamemory— Flavell, Friedrichs & Hoyt, 1970). Since
then, metacognition has been studied in many other areas- of cognition,
for example, comprehension .(Markman, 1977; Revelle, Wellman &
Karabenick,

1985), communication (Shatz, 1978), reasoning (Kuhn, 1989),

and reading ('Garner, 1987)
Comprehension monitoring. Markman (1977) conducted a study on
comprehension monitoring in first, second, and third graders. In her
experiment, she used two tasks— a card game and a magic trick. The
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children were presented with insufficient information about these tasks.
For children in one group the tasks were described and demonstrated, for
children in the other group the tasks were only described. The results
of this study showed that children were more likely to question the
instructions when the task was demonstrated, and the older children
realized the insufficiency of the information before the younger
children did. The first graders had almost no awareness of the fact that
their comprehension of the tasks was flawed. Markman (1977) suggested
that the youngest children in this study processed the information on a
very superficial level, without mentally performing the instructions,
and they became aware that the information was inadequate only after
they were prompted to repeat the instruction or even actually perform
the tasks. She suggested that the children processed the instructions
more carefully, and were able to detect their comprehension failure only
after they made an effort to execute the task.
A flaw in such reasoning was indicated by Revelle et al(

(1985).

They suggested that the younger children's requests for further
explanation, which were stated only after the unsuccessful attempts to
enact the instructions, did not necessarily reflect comprehension
monitoring, but could have just been a reaction to their inability to
execute the task. Requests for additional information could be
considered strong evidence for comprehension monitoring only if they
occurred before the actual attempts to perform the task. On the other
hand, the absence of verbal requests for clarification does not
necessarily indicate the absence of comprehension monitoring. Perhaps
Markman's (1977) study would have benefited from the employment of
additional measures which would evaluate comprehension monitoring, such
as assessment of nonverbal behavior.
Revelle et al. (1985) conducted a study that employed a quasinaturalistic method to examine comprehension monitoring in children 31-
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51 months of age. They combined experimental methods with naturalistic
settings. Experimenters' requests were standardized and structured
allowing for accurate analysis of children's responses, while task and
circumstances were simple and children were accustomed to them.
Moreover, the methodology was further improved by utilization of a
performance task as opposed to a judgment task. Performance tasks
evaluate children's detection of comprehension difficulty after being
exposed to questionable messages. Judgment tasks, on the other hand,
require more explicit judgments of the quality of a message, such as by
specifying whether the message was "faulty" or not. This latter.task was’
used, for example, in Markman's (1977) study. The experiment of Revelle
et al. involved two play-sessions--one was playing in a sandbox and the
other was a pretend tea party. During these play-sessions children were
presented with a variety of requests, some of which posed compliance or
comprehension problems. Performance in response to these requests was
recorded. The results of this study indicated that 3- and 4-year-olds
possess basic comprehension monitoring skills. Participants of four
years of age exhibited successful and competent monitoring of all types
of problems. Discrimination between problematic and non-problematic
requests, as well as proper utilization of strategies for resolving the
problems were also evidenced in 3-year-olds.
This positive evidence of comprehension monitoring in very young
children, which is in contrast with the general findings of earlier
studies (e.g., Markman, 1977; Robinson & Robinson, 1977) illustrates the
importance of choosing appropriate tools and settings when assessing
metacognition in children.
Knowledge about memory. Several studies assessed children's
knowledge of facts about memory by investigating their understanding of
person, task, and strategy variables. The inaugural work in the area of
children's metamemory was a study conducted by Flavell et a l . (1970).
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Although this experiment investigated children's memory monitoring, it
also examined-children's knowledge of person variables in respect to
memory, namely the knowledge children have about their memory span.
Children were asked to predict how many items they would be able to
serially recall from a presented set of pictorial stimuli. Series of
pictures were presented until the children labeled the sequence as too
long for them to recall, or until the whole sequence was presented (10
pictures).

After the prediction, the experimenter read aloud a list of

familiar object names and the children were asked to recall the items
serially. The difference between their actual and predicted memory span
was assessed. The results suggested that older children were more
accurate at predicting their memory span than younger children. The
majority (64%) of 4 1/2-year old children had an unrealistic concept of
their memory span. In fact, these children claimed that they would
serially recall all of the items, even on the longest lists.
Wellman (1977a) researched children's understanding of additional
variables that affect memory. He showed that even 3-year-olds knew that
more items are harder to remember than fewer items (task variable), and
some also knew that noise intervened with remembering (person variable).
Older children in this study (5-year-olds) had an additional
understanding of person variables (e.g., age) and certain strategy
variables that could aid in the retrieval of items. To address the issue
•of discriminant validity, Wellman assessed children's understanding of
variables that are both relevant and irrelevant to cognitive
performance. Without this contro.l, children could b.e credited with the
understanding of variables that affect cognitive performance
(metacognitive knowledge) in situations when they are simply stating
that "everything affects everything"’ (Wellman, 1985, p. 197). It was
found that the majority of 3-year-old children understood that, for
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example, a person's hair color or weight .were unrelated to cognitive
performance.
Wellman (1985) noted that young children's unrealistic assessments
of their memory span in Flavell et a l . (1970). could be explained by the
fact that memory performance is influenced not only by the number of
items but also by the effort and time spent on a particular memory task.
Children seemed to attribute different weights to these variables. He
also stated that the degree to which children understand'the interaction
of cognitive variables and their concepts of the human cognitive system
as a whole, including its features and functions, are still unknown.
Memory monitoring. Memory monitoring in children has often been
investigated via the use of feeling-of-knowing judgments (Wellman,
1977b; Cultice, Somerville', & Wellman, 1983; Butterfield, Nelson & Peck,
1988). A feeling-of-knowing judgment is a person's insight about the
status of an item in his or .her memory. This judgment can be positive,
which implies that one knows that he o.r she has some information in
memory, even if the information is not accessible at the moment. Tip-ofthe-tongue experiences are a subset of positive feeling-of-knowing
judgments. A negative feeling-of-knowing judgment is a decision that a
particular item is not stored in memory and cannot be retrieved or
recognized.
Wellman (1977b) examined children's memory monitoring using
feeling-of-knowing judgments and assessing tip-of-the-tongue
experiences. Children from 6 to 9 years of age were presented with line
drawings of concrete objects. Some of these objects were easy to name
(e.g., banana), and some were less common and, therefore, harder to name
(e.g., metronome). The" task, had three phases: naming, judgment and
recognition. Children were asked to name a picture> and if they were
unable to name it,~ they were asked whether they would be able to
recognize it upon hearing it (the feeling-of-knowing judgment). The
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accuracy of monitoring was measured by comparing the judgments and the
results of later recognition. The results of this study suggested that
children's ability to make feeling-of-knowing judgments increased with
age. Kindergartners were only slightly better than chance at predicting
their later recognition whereas third graders were extremely accurate.
Cultice et al.

(1983) tested preschoolers' memory monitoring using

the same sequence as Wellman (1977b) but with improved methodology... The
naming, judgment and recognition sequence involved naming people from a
set of photographs. The authors argued that proper names and real
pictures, as opposed to object naming and line drawings, provided a more
sensitive and sensible test for preschool-aged children because specific
nominals (proper nouns) are among the first words children learn
(Nelson, 1973) . Moreover, even young children know that it is important
to remember people's names, and..they have much experience .with recalling
or failing to recall them. The results of this study showed that
preschoolers were evaluating an item's memory status on the basis of
relevant cues like familiarity. For example, some children made
spontaneous comments in.the naming phase such as, "she looks familiar"
and "I don’t know him but I have seen him".

Consequently, preschoolers

were rather accurate in their memory monitoring. In addition, this study
demonstrated that positive feeling-of-knowing judgments lead to more
retrieval efforts in school-aged children. This suggested that they were
using monitoring judgment's to regulate their responses.
Some researchers have argued that the original feeling-of-knowing
paradigm, which utilizes absolute yes/no judgments, relies heavily on a
participant's threshold for claiming to know, and this threshold may be
affected by the participant's mental and chronological age (Butterfield
et al., 1988). Butterfield et al. modified the original paradigm to
employ relative comparison judgments. Among the participants were 6-,
10- and 18-year-olds. Relative feeling-of-knowing judgments involves a
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comparison of two words. Each pair was chosen from one of the following
three categories: easy and difficult words, previously correctly and
incorrectly defined words, previously incorrectly and undefined words.
The participant was asked to judge which word of each pair was more
likely to be recognized. It was hypothesized that incorrectly defined
words would yield stronger feelings-of-knowing than words for which the
definition was absent. The results of this study contradicted Wellman's
(1977b) notion that accuracy of memory monitoring increases with the age
of a child. The data from Butterfield et a l . revealed that 6-year-olds
had greater feeling-of-knowing accuracy than older children. Older
children tended to overestimate their recognition abilities.
Butterfield et al.

(1988) suggested that even if younger children

sometimes make accurate judgments about their feeling-of-knowing, they
may be able to do so only under certain conditions. This may occur when
making feeling-of-knowing judgments is the only activity required from
them, or when they are instructed to do so. The authors indicate that
these conditions need to be more accurately specified in future studies
to be able to account for developmental differences in memory,
monitoring.
Methodological Issues
The literature suggests that one of the significant questions in
the area of metacognition which needs to be addressed concerns the
adequacy of tools that have been used to assess this cognitive.
phenomenon (Meichenbaum, Burland, Gruson & Cameron., 1985) . Most
metacognition studies have relied primarily .on verbal data. The
controversy of conscious versus unconscious components of metacognition
discussed earlier poses a problem by itself in light of this fact, and
there are several other issues that need to be considered as well.
First is the issue of introspective access raised by Nisbett and
Wilson (1977). These authors suggested that humans might not be able to
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directly access their higher order cognitive processes, and when'they
make an effort to recount these processes after the behavior occurred,
their reports may be a reflection of post-facto rationalization rather■
than true introspection. In some instances these reports may be
accurate, and in others not. They suggested several factors that might
give rise to errors in verbal reports. One of the most prominent factors
is a time gap between the occurrence of a cognitive process and the
verbal report, where the accuracy of the report is inversely related to
the time. Even though their original article raised a great deal of
debate in the literature (for review, see Guerin & Innes, 1981; White,
1985), it nevertheless, called for discretion in interpretation of
results in studies that use post-performance verbal report on cognitive
processes (Meichenbaum et a l ., 1985).
Another obstacle in assessing metacognition via the use of verbal
reports stems from the fact that a significant proportion of the
population under investigation may not be suitable for this form of
assessment. This subset includes young children or cognitively impaired
individuals. The verbal report may not be appropriate for them due to
many of the following reasons: they may not comprehend the question, or
be able to verbally indicate their experience, or they may simply be
lacking the motivation to give a report.
Wellman (1985) noted that cross-cultural differences in the use of
metaphors and mental verbs to describe internal events might also
confound research findings in this area.

He also stated that age-

related language differences are most obvious in interview tasks, and
therefore suggested that research on metacognition in young children
should utilize yes-no judgments and verbal or nonverbal indication of
choices rather than open-ended interview tasks.
Wellman (1985) further suggested that much of the research on
concepts of cognition tapped instead the children's understanding of

Uncertain Responses

12

mental language (e.g., words such as think, know and remember). The fact
that some children fail to have the appropriate semantic knowledge is
not necessarily indicative of their concepts of cognition. Johnson and
Wellman (1980) assessed 4-year-old children's understanding of the
following verbs: "remember",

"know” and "guess". Children seemed to

confuse them and they appeared oblivious to the factors that separate
the mental.processes described by these verbs. Only further examination
of 'their responses revealed that these children had at least some
understanding of these words, and that they could differentiate between
them- on the basis of their correspondence to reality. Furthermore,
Johnson and Maratsos (1977) documented separate understanding of the
words: "think" and "know" in 4-year-old children, but not in 3-yearolds. The failure to find differentiated understanding of these words,
however, does not necessarily mean that 3-year-old children are unable
to distinguish between these two mental processes. A story and question
task utilized in this study to assess children's comprehension of mental
verbs might have been

insensitive to the abilities of the 3-year-olds

because of their limited language ability.
The third problem in this area relates to the veracity of postfacto verbal reports.

Information-processing theoriesof cognition

suggest a two-process

approach to thinking: automatic vs. effortful

processing (Hasher & Zacks, 1979). In light of the informationprocessing approach, it is possible that unless the experimental task is
carefully chosen, participants may engage in automatic processing when
they may not be aware of their cognitions during performance
(Meichenbaum et al., 1985). Borkowski (1985) suggested that conscious,
and therefore reportable, metacognitive activity is likely to take place
in a situation where one is engaged in a complex or novel task that
involves judgment and decision making during the performance. Otherwise,
participants may engage in post-facto rationalizations when offering a
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verbal report on the cognitive processes that influenced their behavior
(Meichenbaum et al., 1985). Therefore, studies that attempt to assess
participants' cognitions and metacognitions via the use of verbal
reports must choose tasks that involve conscious processes.The previous discussion of the problems concerning verbal data,especially interviews and post-performance reports, was not meant to
suggest' that these techniques are worthless to metacognition research.
They were specified to draw attention to the potential liabilities these
techniques may possess.■Meichenbaum et al.

(1985) offered several

additional techniques for the assessment of metacognition. Among those
suggested were immediate self-report in the form of the think-aloud
technique or interviews during the performance, and observation of
spontaneous self-directed (private) speech. Finally, the authors
proposed the inferential observation of task performance without the use
of self-report as another technique that would be useful in the
assessment of metacognition. Surprisingly, the employment of this
behavioral measure in research has been sporadic. Even if we set aside
the questions raised about the adequacy of using verbal reports per se
as the tools to assess metacognition, one important problem remains. In
particular, verbal reports may be less or not at all appropriate for
young children and language- or cognitively-impaired individuals that
have problems comprehending questions and/or verbally expressing their
responses and experiences. A'behavioral measure that does not employ
verbal reports ’could improve the validity and accuracy of the
assessment. In addition, it could open a window of.opportunity to
explore populations that were previously only partially reachable and
questions that were circumscribed by a sole-focused methodology in the
past.

Uncertain Responses

14

The Uncertainty Paradigm
Creating difficulty in cognitive tasks has been used in many
studies of metacognition in humans (e.g. Markman, 1977; Revelle et al.,
1985; Robinson & Robinson, 1977). However, most of these studies
utilized verbal tasks and required verbal responses. Recently,
researchers interested in comparing the metacognitive abilities of human,
and nonhuman animals have used an innovative approach to the study of
metacognition (Shields, Smith, & Washburn, 1997; Smith, Schull, Strote,
McGee, Egnor, & Erb, 1995; Smith, Shields, Allendoerfer, & Washburn,
1998; Smith, Shields,- Schull, & Washburn, 1997). The researchers in this
area did not have the luxury of all of their participants being verbal.
Therefore they employed.an uncertainty paradigm in which simple
.perceptual and memory tasks were used. These were designed to create
difficulty for the participants. Crucially, participants were also
provided with a concrete response that allowed them to deal with the
difficulty and uncertainty. This response was termed the uncertain or
"escape" response because it allowed participants to abandon trials of
their choosing.
Smith et a l . (1998) used the uncertainty paradigm to test memory
monitoring in human adults and nonhuman primates. First, a relatively
simple, nonverbal memory task was required so that rhesus monkeys could
participate. Second, some trials had to be made more difficult or
uncertain than others. Third, an uncertain response had to be made
available. The researchers then determined whether uncertain responses
occurred more for difficult than for less difficult trials.
The task that Smith et al. (1998) chose was a serial probe
recognition task. In a classic serial probe recognition (SPR) task, a
list of pictorial items is presented to participants. Subsequently, a
probe item is presented. Participants are given a binary response option
and instructed to respond "there" if the probe was from the previously
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presented list or "not there" if the probe was not presented in the
list. Smith et- al. elegantly innovated the SPR task by expanding the
binary response pool by adding a third response, the uncertain response.
This third response allowed participants to abandon the current trial in
favor of an easier trial.
To fulfill the requirement of differential difficulty among
trials, Smith et al.

(1998) took advantage of the well-known serial

position effect, one of the most robust of memory phenomena. Ebbinghaus
(1885/1913) labeled the improved memory for items at the beginning of
the list a primacy effect, and the augmented memory for the final items
a recency effect. This U-shaped serial position curve has been
documented in memory.studies utilizing recall and recognition tests,
with lists of items consisting of words, non-sense syllables and
pictures

(for a review, see Crowder, 1976). The serial position effect

,has been found in humans as well as in several nonhuman animal species
(e.g., Glanzer & Cunitz, 1966; Sands & Wright, 1980; Roberts & Kraemer,
1981; Wright, Santiago, Sands, Kendrick & Cook, 1985).
Smith et al.

(1998) suggested that-in the memory task utilized in

their' experiment, participants would experience an increased amount of
uncertainty for the middle section of the memory items relative to the
uncertainty experienced for the initial and final items. Therefore,
participants should use the uncertain response more for the mid-list
items than for the initial and final items. Indeed, these results were
obtained. The participants confronted the memory task in an adaptive,
manner. They appeared to engage in memory monitoring and employed the
escape response when they encountered.the most indeterminate memory
traces.
In addition, Smith et al.

(1998) proposed that the overall

performance on trials in which the escape response is available should
be superior to the performance on trials where the escape response is
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not allowed. This means that when the escape response is available,
participants can either escape, if they feel uncertain, or they can
volunteer a primary response ("there" or "not there"), if they are more
confident of the corrfect answer. If the participants monitor their
memory adaptively, the escape response allows them to avoid trials for
which they do not know the correct answer. Under these circumstances, if
participants actually volunteer a primary response, their error rate
should be relatively low. These "voluntary try" trials should yield a
higher proportion of correct responses than the "forced try" trials, in
which the escape response i s ,unavailable and participants are forced to
make a primary response even for the probes about which they feel
uncertain. Again, the results of their study supported this hypothesis.
The procedure employed by Smith et al.

(1998) has been used to

test memory monitoring in human adults and nonhuman primates. It has
never been used to test cognitive monitoring in children. Given the
aforementioned problems in assessing metacognition, the simplicity of
this.task and its nonverbal nature

could make it a feasible tool in

testing these cognitive mechanisms

in children.

Support for Using the SPR Task
Although the SPR task has not been used to examine memory
monitoring in children, other memory phenomena have been investigated
via the use of similar techniques. A probe-type pictorial memory task
has been used to investigate short-term memory processes in children of
various ages (Atkinson, Hansen & Bernbach, 1.964; Hansen, 1965; Calfee,
Hetherington & Waltzer,- 1966) as well as in children with mental
retardation (Ellis & Munger, 1966) in the past. The serial position
effect was documented in these studies of memory.
The recognition abilities in
documented using several different

children of various ages have been
techniques. One of these procedures

involves' presenting a list of items to participants while asking them to
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indicate whether or not an item is a repeat. Corsini, Jacobus & Leonard
(1969) tested preschool children's recognition skills for words and
pictures using this procedure and found a superior recognition for
pictures. Evidence of good recognition memory for pictures in preschool
children was subsequently supported by many researchers (e.g. Brown and
Scott, 1971; Perlmutter & Myers,

1974, 1976). Brown and Campione (1972)

noted that the ability to detect repeating pictures is well established
in preschool children, and their recognition of distinct pictorial ,
stimuli is similar to that which has been reported for adults. The
research suggested no reason to expect hindrance in using a serial probe
recognition task in order to assess memory monitoring in preschool
children.
In addition, Butterfield et al.

(1988) in their study of the

developmental aspects of memory monitoring emphasized the need for
making a distinction between a person's potential monitoring ability and
the utilization of the products from the person's 'monitoring. However,
the most frequently used paradigm for assessing memory monitoring, the
feeling-of-knowing judgment, does not allow for this distinction,
because it taps the former but it leaves out the latter. The feeling-ofknowing judgment is a person's insight about the status of an item in
his or her memory. Young children may discriminate information from
feeling-of-knowing judgments in their memories but it is unclear whether
they can spontaneously use it in a proper way (Butterfield et al.,
1988). Clearly, a behavioral measure assessing memory monitoring is
needed.
Finally, the cognitive literature has made.an insistent call for
improved assessment of cognitive monitoring in children, such as the use
of simple, well-defined cognitive tasks, which could tap children's
cognitive monitoring without introducing confounding variables built
into the assessment tools utilized in past studies. Developmental
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psychologists recorded some of the metacognitive limitations of younger
children (Baker, 1994), On the other hand, one should keep on mind that
science can be no better than its methods. Therefore, among the most
important responsibilities one has as a scientist is to continually
c

search for improved ways to explore the phenomena in question.
This study employed the inferential observation of task
performance as a behavioral measure to assess memory monitoring in fiveyear old children. The uncertainty paradigm of Smith et a l . (1998)
served as a procedural guideline to induce and consider memory
monitoring. The indicated procedure was used to minimize the problems -of
discriminant validation as well as the potential liabilities of
utilizing verbal reports in the assessment of metacognition.
It was hypothesized that five-year-olds would behaviorally
demonstrate adept memory monitoring via the use of the uncertain
response when the most indeterminate memory traces were probed.
Specifically, their use of the uncertain response would be an invert
reflection of the serial position curve of their memory performance.
Moreover, when their performance is compared to a group that was denied
the escape response, the performance of the former would be' superior.
This reduction in error rate would demonstrate an adaptive use of the uncertainty response and memory monitoring.
Method
.Participants
Participants of this experiment were 43 4.5- to 5.5-year-old
children (mean age = 5.09, SD = 0.33) from the Missoula, Montana,
community. Recruitment of the participants was conducted via information
sheets distributed to the parents by the investigator, her research
assistant and the directors of day-care institutions. The parents were
asked to make an appointment either in person or by placing a phone call
to the -investigator if they were interested in the study.. Participants
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were randomly assigned to the following'two groups: experimental (21
children) and control (19 children) .. The data obtained from three
children were excluded from the analysis because of their inability
and/or iack of motivation to follow the instructions.
Apparatus
An IBM compatible computer was used to present pictorial stimuli
on a monitor in both the pilot study and the actual experiment. An
EZscreen™ touch screen add-on attached to a 15-inch color monitor
recorded the responses. Participants were seated on a height-adjustable
chair at arm's length away from the monitor.
Procedure
Prior to the experiment, an informed consent form was filled out
by a parent or legal guardian of each child.
The experimental procedure was analogous to the one used in Smith
et al. (1998), Experiments 1 and 3. Each trial consisted of two phases.
The first phase involved the presentation of a list of to-be-remembered
items, and the second phase consisted of the presentation of response
choices. The number of choices depended on whether a participant was
assigned to the control or experimental group. The control group was
given a classic (binary-response) serial probe recognition task. The
experimental group was allowed an additional choice— the escape or
uncertainty response. The participants were assigned to the control and
experimental groups randomly.
Stimulus presentation phase. On each trial> participants made a
voluntary, trial-initiation response by touching a white circle 1 cm in
diameter positioned in the upper left corner of the screen. Below the
circle, there was a number that'indicated the number of the trial.
Participants were then presented with a list of pictures chosen from
among 81 digitized color drawings of common objects such as an apple, a

Uncertain Responses

20

tiger, and a camera. Prior to this study, four five-year-olds were asked
to name 101 drawings that had been used by Smith et al.

(1998). The

selected 81 drawings were those that all of the children were able to
name. Each picture was presented sequentially in the upper left of the.
screen. The list length started at 6 items, and increased by one with
each new trial. After four trials the list length reached 10 items and
no further increments to the list length were made. The first four
trials served as a transition from the practice session, and were
excluded from later analysis. The pictorial stimuli for each trial were
selected randomly. Repetitions within a trial's list were not allowed
but no other limitations on the frequency of 'repetitions were imposed.
Each item was displayed for approximately 900 ms, which was the time
required to draw the picture on the monitor. The presentation of the
next item followed.immediately. In the case of the final list, item, a
retention interval of 1 s followed the presentation of the item.
Response phase. The response phase differed between the control
and experimental groups. For the control group, a probe picture was
displayed in the upper left of the screen. A red icon with a large,
white letter X was displayed in the upper right of the screen. The red
icon was approximately the same size as the probe picture.. If the probe
was from among the pictures presented on the preceding list, a correct
response was to touch the probe picture. If the probe was absent from
the-list, a correct choice was to touch the letter X. A correct response
earned a computer-generated reward sound, verbal.praise and a marble
dispensed by the experimenter. An incorrect response resulted in a
penalty sound (a brief buzz of approximately 500 ms) and no marble
reward. These were the only response options presented to the control
group. Thus, the control group performed the classical serial probe
recognition task.
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The experimental group followed the same procedure, except that it
was also- offered an escape choice--the uncertain response. On each trial
a yellow icon with a black question mark (2) in the' middle was
illuminated in the lower center of the screen along with the probe
picture and the letter X in their previously specified locations. All of
the, icons were approximately the same In size (3 x 3.5 inches). Choosing
the uncertain response cleared the current trial. A new trial, in which
only one response was illuminated, followed. If the probe was from the
list, the probe picture appeared on the screen. If it was not, the X was
displayed. The reward was secured by touching the displayed object.
In order to prevent the overuse of the uncertainty choice, its
cost was actively modified. The program calculated the ratio of recent
escapes to primary responses. If (recent escapes - recent primaries)
exceeded four, the use of the uncertain response froze the touchscreen
for a period of time. This period was determined by the formula (recent ■
escapes - recent primary responses)2 x 50 ms. Therefore, the overuse of
the uncertain response resulted in the delayed opportunity to give a
response that would be registered by the touchscreen and thus in the
delayed reward. The cost of overusing the uncertain response was
designed to discourage participants from employing it when they knew the
correct answer, saving it for the instances in which their memory trace
was more indeterminate. The experimenter gave the children a verbal
explanation of this circumstance, stating the "the computer is tired
from so many questions, because we have been asking the computer for
help too many times".
The computer was programmed so that 40% of the trials were those
in which the probe picture was absent from the list ("not there"
trials), and the remaining 60% were "there" trials. This trial
distribution was chosen to maximize the number of trials per serial
position but at the same, time not to prompt children to use the probe as
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a default response. The computer program was set to present the trials
using the following rules: for every 10 trials, six were "there" and
four were "not there" trials; for every ten "there" trials, there was
one probe per serial position.
The experiment lasted approximately 40 minutes, and each child
completed an average of 45 experimental trials in addition to the
average of 5 practice trials. At the beginning of the experiment, each
participant heard the instructions (see Appendix) told by the
experimenter. Each participant was given several trials to practice
responding using the touchscreen. The practice trials differed from the
experimental trials in their list length. The list length for the
practice trials- started at 4 items, and increased by one- with each new
trial. During this time, the researcher had an opportunity to check for
children's correct understanding of the instructions. The children were
asked whether or not they saw the probe picture, and what would be the
appropriate response to give in that situation. If they responded
correctly, the practice trial session was terminated, and the
experimental session was started.
At the end of the experiment, the children were given positive
verbal feedback. The experimenter reassured ;them of their good
performance on the task. Each child received on average 8 stickers of
his or her choice from a motivational sticker collection in exchange for
the marbles, irrespective of marbles gained. In addition, children who
participated in the experiment (or their parents) received five dollars
in gift certificates to Dairy Queen or cash, depending on their choice. ,
Pilot Study
There was a pilot study conducted prior to the actual experiment.
Eleven 5-year-olds (mean age = 5.07, SD=0.53) participated in this
study. One child's results were'excluded from the analysis because of
his inability and/or lack of motivation to attend to' the presentation of
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the pictorial stimuli. Children from the pilot study were not eligible
for participation in the later study.
Children in the pilot study performed the same experimental task
as -described above, but the task parameters were manipulated across
participants. These calibration trials were designed to determine
parameters that would yield the appropriate level of difficulty for the
experimental task. Careful examination of children's performance under
different conditions allowed us to determine more appropriate length of
the interstimulus interval, stimulus presentation duration, as well as
the list length, and the pattern of the practice trials. In addition,
the pilot study indicated the necessity of implementing the trialinitiation response that had allowed children to focus their attention
to the appropriate area of the display screen immediately prior to the
stimulus presentation.
Results
Primary Memory Performance
Children's primary memory performance was considered for a list
length of 10 items. The first four trials for jeach child with list
lengths of 6,7,8 and 9 items were aimed only for training purposes, and
were excluded from the analysis. Table 1 summarizes the percentage
correct for each serial position, all the trials combined and all "not
there" trials for the experimental and control groups.

Insert Table .1 about here

The possibility of temporal effects, such .as fatigue, was explored
by dividing each child's data into two equal halves. The first and
second halves of the children's trials were analyzed separately. Table 2
summarizes the percentage of correct for this •split-half data,
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Insert'Table 2 about here

Memory Monitoring and the Use of the Uncertain Response ■
In the experimental group,

children's performance wasfurther

evaluated on the basis of their use of the uncertain (escape) response.
Figure 1A illustrates their escape behavior in relation to their primary
memory performance. For comparison, the primary memory performance of
the control group, which was not allowed the escape response, is
depicted in Figure IB.

Insert Figure 1 about here

Split-half analysis was again conducted to evaluate the potential
temporal effects on the data. Figure 2 depicts this divided performance
for the experimental and control groups. Figures 2A and 2B illustrate
the performance of the experimental group on the first and second halves
of trials, respectively.. Correspondingly, figures 2C and 2D depict the
performance of the control‘group on the first and second halves of
trials, respectively.

Insert Figure- 2 about here

. Signal Detection Analysis of Performance
The data are particularly well suited to a signal detection
analysis, a technique commonly used in studies on perception and
cognition. In signal detection theory, as described by MacMillan and
Creelman (1991), performance is analyzed according to the degree to
which the participants' responses reflect the stimuli and the degree to
which participants show bias in their responding.'
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Sensitivity. Sensitivity refers to the participant's ability to
discriminate between stimuli. In this context, sensitivity was measured
by the degree to which "there" and "not there" responses mirrored
"there" and "not there" items. If the probe was from among the pictures
presented on the list ("there" item), a correct response was to touch
the probe picture ("there" response). In signal-detection theory
terminology, correctly recognizing the "there" item is termed a hit;
while failing to recognize it (touching the X) is a miss. If the probe
was absent from the list ("not there" item), a correct choice was to
touch the letter X ("not there" response). Correctly responding "not
there" is termed a correct rejection. Erroneously recognizing an item as
"there" is a false alarm. The data can be summarized in a 2x2 table
displaying either the frequencies of these four events occurring or
their response rates calculated as the proportion of trials the
participant made a particular response. Table .3 shows.the frequencies
and proportions of the correct responses (hits and correct rejections)
as well as the incorrect responses (misses and false alarms) for the
experimental and control groups.

Insert Table 3 about here

A sensitivity measure can be obtained from the discrepancy between
a hit rate and a false alarm rate. Signal Detection Theory offers a
sensitivity measure called d' (d-prime). Computing d-prime requires
first a z-transformation, which converts a hit and false alarm rate to
standard deviation units or z-scores, and then d-prime is obtained as a
difference between these transformed hit and false alarm rates. Hence,
the resulting formula for d-prime is:
d' = z(H)-z(F).
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First, the overall d-primes for the experimental and control
groups were calculated. The d-prime for the experimental group was 1.08
and the d-prime for the control group was 0.73. Thus, the experimental
group showed an increase of 0.35 standard deviation units in sensitivity
as compared to the control group.
Second, the individual d-primes were computed for each participant
in both groups. A directional, two-independent samples t-test was
conducted on these d-primes to compare the sensitivity of the
experimental and control groups (t (38)=1.585, £=0.061). These findings
suggest that there was no difference at alpha=0.05 level between the
means of d-primes for the experimental and control groups.
Third, each data file was again- divided into two equal halves to
check for possible temporal effects. Two d-primes, one for the first
half, the other for the second half of the trials were computed for each
child. A directional two-independent samples t-test was performed to
compare the differences in sensitivity between the experimental and
control groups on the first half of the trials {t (38)=2.064, £=0.023).
/

The same statistical technique- was executed for the d-primes from the
second half of the trials (t(38)=0.7, £=0.244). These results indicate
that the mean d-prime for.the experimental group was significantly
higher than that of the control group for the first half of the trials.
However, this difference was eliminated for the second half of the
trials. Figure 3 illustrates the mean d-primes for the experimental and
control groups in the first and the second halves of trials.

Insert Figure 3 about here

Response bias. Response bias refers to the inclination to favor
one response over another. The most commonly used bias measure for
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signal detection analysis is called criterion location (c), and is
defined as c=-0.5[z (H)+z(F)].
In the context of the presented experimental scenario this means
that a positive bias is a tendency to favor the "not there" response
(X). Consequently, a negative bias is a tendency to prefer "there"
response (probe).
An overall response bias as measured by the criterion location (c)
was computed for the experimental and control group. The control group
exhibited a relatively strong negative bias (c=-0.298) preferring
"there" over the "not there" response. This was more than double that of
the bias of the experimental group (c=-0.131).
Discussion
Both experimental and control groups exhibited serial position
effects in their primary memory performance (see Figures 1A and IB).
However, the escape responses for the experimental group did not mirror
their primary memory performance (Figure 1A). It is possible that the
variability in memory abilities among participants contributed to the
lack of positive findings. Although their primary memory performance
mimicked the well-established findings of serial position effects, the
feelings of uncertainty may be more subjective in this age group. These
feelings of uncertainty may have differed in content and degree from one
child to another and thus may have been more susceptible to the
averaging effects present in the graphs of overall performance, which
are insensitive to inter-individual differences. Although studies with
human adults have also used the. between-subject design and evaluated the
overall performance of the whole group, younger children may exhibit
greater inter-individual fluctuations in performance. This can occur
because their cognitive abilities including memory monitoring are
subject to change during the course of development. Unfortunately, it
was not feasible to obtain a clear .graphical description of each child's
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performance on different serial position trials due to the relatively
small number of trials for each child.
Additionally, the overall performance was evaluated on a temporal
basis for possible practice .effects and/or effects of fatigue. Given the
inconclusive results, it was suspected that children's performance might
have changed during the course of the experiment. Therefore, the data
from each child was divided into two equal halves. The overall
performance on the first half of the trials was evaluated separately
from the data on the second half. Alas, this' division, which resulted in
a smaller number of trials evaluated in each group, led to an even
greater variability in the results rendering the detection of stable
trends via the means of graphical analysis unattainable.
It is possible that, in addition to the differences in ability,
the relatedness of some stimuli and their repetitions affected primary
memory performance and memory monitoring accuracy. Except for
repetitions within a trial's list that were not allowed, no other
restrictions on the frequency of repetitions were imposed. Therefore, it
is plausible to assume that participants, who viewed a particular
picture in a .trial's list at an easier serial position earlier on in the
game, could have carried over their memory of this picture to the latter
trials. In the latter trials this- picture was tested as a probe from a
more difficult serial- position. This more difficult-to-remember serial
position that was hypothesized to yield a more indeterminate memory
trace, although remembered for wrong reasons, nevertheless produced a
correct response. Hence, participants' performance might have been
influenced by these repetitions, which 'led to an obscured picture of
memory monitoring occurrence.
The visual similarity of some stimuli could have also obfuscated
participants' memory performance. Children may have confused one picture
with another if these shared several visual features (e.g. a picture of
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a lioness and a picture of a tiger, or a printer and a typewriter). In
addition, the visual attractiveness or a personal significance of some
stimuli could have obscured memory performance as well. Although the
presentation of stimuli was very brief, and. for the most part children
did not have the time to verbally label or comment on the stimuli, it
has happened that a child, delighted by a particular picture,.labeled
the picture during the presentation phase. If this picture then came up
as a probe, the memory of- it was enhanced by the child's verbalization
and, regardless of the serial position of this picture, the child gave a
correct answer.
Furthermore, as Kelemen, Frost and Weaver (2000) suggested,
guessing generates noise that can distort metacognitive accuracy in
recognition predictions. Thus, participants, who do in fact monitor
their memory accurately, might exhibit ambiguous metacognitive
performance because' they guessed on the items they did not know.
Consequently, correct guessing could have contributed to the added
variability within our data and prevented us from finding the escape
curve that would mirror participants' primary memory performance.
The aforementioned reasons have led to a search for a measure of
cognitive performance that could evaluate the overall performance of
both' of the groups, as well as that of the individual participants,
without taking into consideration the serial positions of the probes. It.
was suggested that signal-detection analysis (SDA) could handle this
task. There is a particular advantage to using SDA as the means for
evaluating memory performance. SDA offers a measure of memory
sensitivity that is independent of the participants' bias to favor one
response over another. The. mechanics of SDA were explained in the
Results section.
■Only the hit rate was explicitly utilized in the initial graphical
analysis, which could have lead to a rather inaccurate picture. With
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only one number (proportion of hits) at hand, one would miss an
important piece of information. Obviously, a participant who yields a
hit rate of 0.85 and a false alarm rate of 0.3 is more sensitive than a
participant who generates a hit rate of 0.85 but also a false alarm rate
of 0.85. Clearly, the second case indicates that the participant favored
the "there" response with no correspondence to the actual stimulus.
Hence', the proportion of correct responses as a single indicator of
performance is appropriate only when there is no tendency to prefer one
response over another. In this study, the proportion of "there” and "not
there" trials was not equal, but was instead set on 60% and 40%,
respectively. Therefore, the signal-detection analysis offered a more
appropriate, measure of performance, given the experimenter-implemented
bias, in addition to the bias potentially used by our participants'.
The comparison of individual d-primes was not statistically
significant, suggesting no difference between the experimental and
control groups with regard to sensitivity.
However, the results indicate that the control group had a
tendency to prefer the "there" response over the "not there" response.
This was documented by their negative response bias, which was more than
double the1bias of the experimental group. It is possible that
participants in the control group used the -'there" response as a default
when unsure., Paradoxically, this in turn could have contributed to the
higher overall percentage of correct responses because the distribution
of "there" and "not there" trials was set on 60% and 40%, respectively.
In other words, this means that even if the participant was completely
oblivious to the. stimuli and used the "there" response on all trials
indiscriminately, this participant would still yield a rate of 60%
correct responses.
Perhaps our failure to find the significant overall improvement in
memory performance for the experimental-group was in part caused by the
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fact that the control group used the "there" response as a default in
situations when unsure. Consequently, this guessing, which was correct
the majority of the time due to the trial distribution, inadvertently
improved their performance.
Still, the subsequent analyses of the first and the second halves
of children's trials indicated that the sensitivity in discrimination
between stimuli was different for the experimental and control groups.
The participants in the experimental group were significantly more
sensitive in discrimination between stimuli than children in the control
group for the first half of their trials. This sensitivity, however,
changed during the second half of the experiment when there were no
significant differences between the experimental and control groups.
These findings suggest that the performance of the experimental group
was superior to that of the control group during the first half of the
experiment. During the second half of the experiment, fatigue could have
played a role in children's ability to discriminate between stimuli
annulling the advantage of the experimental group. The fatigue could
have resulted from the increased demands on children in the experimental
group, who were required to perform an additional task, namely, to
explicitly monitor their memory in terms of using the uncertain
response. Children in the control group did not have this additional
demand on their 'resources, and in fact their mean performance was marked
by a slight increase in sensitivity for the second half of the trials
(see Figure 3). Children in the control group' actually might have
benefited from additional practice as the trials progressed.
Although the effects of fatigue and practice were not the subjects
of inquiry in the present study, the possibility of these two factors
influencing the results is worth mentioning and certainly worthy of
exploration in future research'endeavors. In the light of discussion
recently- revisited in the metacognition literature pertaining to the
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issue of conscious versus unconscious metacognitive processing, the
potential effect of fatigue on the ability to monitor memory processing
is very interesting. Hasher and Zacks (1979) suggested that the
processes underlying cognition can be either automatic or effortful.
Effortful processing requires conscious attention, but automatic
processing makes minimal demands on attentional resources. If memory
monitoring is indeed subject to the effects of fatigue, then that would
suggest that this type of metacognition requires conscious processing.
It would be of course premature to make any conclusions pertaining to
this issue, but this idea may serve as a pointer for future research.
Several comments and improvements are suggested for future
investigations. A larger sample size would increase the power of the
statistical analyses and the potential effect size. The second
recommendation relates to the innovation of the experimental design. A
within-subj'ect, repeated measures design that would yield a higher
number of trials, per participant seems a logical next step in this line
of research. If the participants could be tested on several occasions,
serving as their own controls, the noise created by large inter
individual differences would be dramatically reduced. Additionally, it
would allow clearer answers for some questions generated in this studysuch a s : Does the experimental task that offers the escape/uncertain
response make additional demands on attentional resources or is the
performance of the control task influenced’by practice?
The experimental task itself could also be improved. For example,
imposing more severe restrictions on the frequency of stimuli
repetitions, and changing the trial distribution ratio could help to
obtain a clearer picture of primary memory and memory monitoring
performance. Substituting pictures of familiar objects for pictorial
stimuli with distinct geometrical shapes could decrease problems with
verbal labeling, as well as the possible personal- significance of
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-stimuli. On the other hand, this change could decrease the
attractiveness of the experimental task itself, and children's interest
in playing' the game would be compromised.
Having learned about some of the difficulties-in using this
experimental paradigm for testing five-year-old children, it would be
interesting to.investigate younger children with an improved design. A
developmental comparison of memory monitoring abilities across several
different ages would not only be exciting but also very instructive in
the field of metacognitive research.
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Appendix
Experimental Group Instructions
We are going to play a game now. First, you have to .touch a circle
that will come up on the screen. The computer will then show you a list
of eight pictures. You watch those pictures carefully. Then, the
computer will show you one picture, and two signs [the experimenter
shows the child two cards, one with the letter X_j_ the other with the
question■mark _?]•

this picture was in the list that the computer

showed you, let the computer know by touching'the picture. If it wasn't
in the list, touch the letter X. If you don't know, touch the sign
you touch the sign

?,

If

the computer will show you a correct answer. Then

touch that answer.
If you were right, the computer will make a beep sound and I will
give you a marble. We will play this game many times. Try to get as many
marbles as you can. At the end of our playing, you can exchange the
marbles you won for a toy you choose. We have some toys here. .
If you were wrong, the computer will make a buzz, and I will not
give you a marble. After that we will start again and play a new game.
You start a new game by touching the circle that will appear on the
screen.
Now, let me show you how it works. If you don't understand, just
ask me, and I will show you again: Then, you will try it three times,
and after that,'you can start playing.
Control Group Instructions
We are. going to play a game now. First, you have to touch a circle
that will come up on the screen. The computer will then show you a list
of eight pictures. You watch those pictures carefully. Then, the
computer will show you one picture, and one sign [the experimenter shows
the child one card with the letter X]. If this picture was in the list
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the computer showed you, let the computer know by touching the picture.
If it wasn't in the list, touch the letter X.
If you were right, the computer will make a beep sound and I will
give you a'marble. We will play this game many times. Try to get as many
marbles as you can. At the end of our playing, you can exchange .the
marbles you won for a toy you choose. We have some toys here.
If you were wrong, the computer will make a buzz, and I will not
give you a marble. After that we will start again and play a new game.
You start a new game by touching a circle that will appear on the
screen.
Now, let me show you how it works. If you don't understand,, just
ask me, and I will show you again. Then, you will try it three times,
and after that, you can start playing.
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Table 1
Percentage of Correct Responses for List Length 10

Trial
Type

Groups
Experimental

Control

SP1

76

75

SP2

78

70

S'P3 •

68

53

SP4

66

70

SP5

74

76

SP6

71

80

SP7

73

74

SP8

77

93

SP9

80

76

SP10

85

77

All T

75

75

All NT

66

53

Overall

71

66

Note: SP = serial position; All T = all "there" trials combined; All NT
= all "not there" trials combined
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Table 2
Percentage of Correct Responses for the Split-Half Data

Trial

Experimental Group
2nd half

Control Group
1st half

2nd half

Type

1st half

SP1

88

65

72

78

SP2

71

84

74

65

SP3

75

64

67 '

37

SP4

73

56

58

82

SP5

74

75

67

84

SP6

77

65

76

86

SP7

.69

76

60

87

SP8

87

65

95

92

SP9

83

76

77

75.

SP10

86 .

83

83

71

ALL T

79

71

73

76

ALL NT

67

64

56

49

OVERALL

74

68

66

65'

Note: SP=serial position; All T=all "there" trials combined; All NT=all
"not there" 'trials combined
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Table 3
Siqnal-Detection Distribution of Responses

_____________ GROUP_________
Response Type

Experimental

Control

Hits

341

283

False alarms

145

83

Misses

116

95

'

Correct rejections

161

160
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Figure Captions
Figure 1A. Serial probe recognition performance for the experimental
group. Percentage of correct responses and escaped trials (when
applicable) is shown. NT = "not there" trials in which the probe had not
been in the preceding list.

Figure IB. Serial probe recognition performance for the control group.
Percentage of correct responses and escaped trials (when applicable) is
shown. NT = "not there" trials in which the probe had not been in the
preceding list.

Figure 2A. Serial probe recognition, performance on the first half of the
trials for the experimental group. NT = "not there" trials in which the
probe had not been in the preceding list.

Figure 2B. Serial probe recognition performance on the second half of
the trials for the experimental group. NT = "not there" trials in which
the probe had not been in the preceding list.

Figure 2C. Serial probe recognition performance on the first half of the
trials for the control group. NT = "not there" trials in which the probe
had not been, in the preceding list.

Figure 2D. Serial probe recognition performance on the second of the
trials for the control group. NT = "not there" trials in which the probe
had not been in the preceding list.

Figure 3 . Change in mean sensitivity (d-primes) for the first and second
halves of sessions for the experimental and control groups.
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Figure 2 C .
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